

PERSONALITY

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PERSONALITY

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PERSONALITY

WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO SUPERPERSONALITIES AND THE
INTERPERSONAL CHARACTER OF IDEAS

BY
PAUL CARUS

“Volk und Knecht und Ueberwinder,
Sie gestehn zu jeder Zeit,
Höchstes Glück der Erdenkinder
Sei nur die Persönlichkeit.”—GOETHE.

CHICAGO
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LONDON AGENTS
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1911

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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PERSONALITY.

WE WANT TO BE OURSELVES.

WHAT we call personality constitutes the distinctive feature of a person, and a person is a human being of a concrete and definite individuality. Human means rational, and so the term person is used in contrast to lower creatures such as brute animals. Accordingly we understand by personality all the several features of a man's individual existence, including his bodily appearance, his habits and his character; and a man evinces his superiority over beasts not only by his intelligence and foresight, but also and mainly by his moral aspirations. Personality therefore is prized highest among all the good things to be met in the field of our experience. We respect, or at least ought to respect, personality in others, and one's own personality is a sacred trust which implies weighty and high duties.

The word "person" is to a great extent a synonym of the word "soul," the main difference being that "person" is more comprehensive; for it denotes not only the essential but also the unessential and purely accidental features of man's individual exist-

ence. When we speak of man's personality we include his bodily appearance, and in fact think of it first, but we think of it as the expression of the soul that stirs behind it. We think of a man's personality as his face and stature, but the features and figure of a person are remembered as reflecting the guiding principle of his life, his character.

Other nations have coined their words for personality according to its most obvious feature, the bodily appearance. In Chinese the word "person" is 身 *shan*, which also means "body" and was originally the picture of the figure of a man. In Pali, the language of the sacred books of the Buddhists, "person" is called by a compound word *namo-rupa*, which literally translated means "name [and] form." To the people of Pali speech the personality of a man was first of all his name, and then his bodily appearance as it assumed a material form; whereas in reality it comprises not only the name and form but also his past memories, the history of his life, his individual tastes, his inclinations—in a word, his character. As a man was known by a special name and recognized by his features and corporeal characteristics, these were considered as constituting his personality, or "name-form," *namo-rupa*.

Man associates all the motives of actions which are expressive of his own character with the idea of his self and speaks of himself as "I" and "me."

He says, "This concerns *me*, *I* do this, *I* will this, *I* love this, *I* hate that;" and this little pronoun "I," called by philosophers with the Latin name "ego," becomes the center round which cluster all these notions of our own yearnings and intentions, likes and dislikes, preferences and aversions, hopes and aspirations. In itself the word "I" is as empty as are all abstract terms, but how replete it is to each of us, containing all that constitutes the very core of our souls!

The contents of this term "I" or the "ego" which covers our continuous existence from the cradle to the grave, is our inmost being, our self, our personality; what we think and what we feel is the only thing that is truly ours, and this truth is thus expressed by Goethe in poetic form:

"Ich weiss, dass mir nichts angehört
Als der Gedanke, der ungestört
Aus meiner Seel' will fliessen.
Und jeder günstige Augenblick,
Den mich ein liebendes Geschick
Von Grund aus lässt geniessen."

[I know that naught belongs to me
Except the thought that light and free
Out of my soul is flowing;
Also of joy each moment rare
Which my good fortune kind and fair
Upon me is bestowing!]

Our personality is and ought to be dear to us.
We are responsible for it and whatever may befall

we ought to regard our highest duty the task of keeping inviolate its integrity, dignity, and honor.

All other cares and responsibilities we may have are subservient to our main task in life, which is the progressive unfoldment, the constant enhancement and ennoblement of our self. Everything is secondary so long as we remain faithful to the ideal of our personality.

The possessions which belong to man, his goods and chattels and bank account, are external to him; they are his property, they are what he has, and holds and controls, but his personality is the man himself, and it is but natural that he wants to be just such a man as he is. Heredity, tradition and his own experience have shaped his character, and his character finds expression in his will. Therefore a man might like to change places with others, he might be glad to change fortunes, position in life, fame, family relations and even name, but he would be loath to change his personality. Everybody clings to his own self. We quote again from Goethe who expresses this truth in an epigram, published in his *Westöstlicher Divan* (VIII), as follows:

“Volk und Knecht und Ueberwinder,
Sie gestehn zu jeder Zeit,
Höchstes Glück der Erdenkinder
Sei nur die Persönlichkeit.
Jedes Leben sei zu führen,
Wenn man sich nur nicht vermisst,

Alles könne man verlieren,
Wenn man bliebe was man ist."

[Folks and slaves and he who conquers,
They confess howe'er it be,
Highest bliss for which man hankers
Is his personality.
Any life he rather chooseth
If himself he would not miss,
Anything he gladly loseth
If he stays just what he is.]

Schopenhauer¹ describes this habitual clinging to one's own personality more tersely in two lines, thus:

"Mir geht nun auf der Welt nichts über mich;
Denn Gott ist Gott, und ich bin ich."

[Naught can surpass me, replace or supply,
For God is God, and I am I.]

With a good deal of sarcasm the same idea echoes through the lines of Wilhelm Busch,² the famous German humorist, who says of the evil-doer:

"Auch hat er ein höchst verrucht Gelüst,
"Grad' so zu sein wie er eben ist."

[The bad one maliciously listeth, you see,
Just such a one as he is, to be.]

From all this it becomes apparent what an important idea the concept personality is, and for this

¹ Schopenhauer puts this rhyme into the mouth of Thrasy-machos, one of his disputants in a dialogue. See his *Panerga und Paralipomena*, Vol. II; *Kleine dialogische Schlussbelustigung* of the chapter *Zur Lehre von der Unzerstörbarkeit unseres wahren Wesens durch den Tod*.

² See the writer's translation of *Edward's Dream* by Wilhelm Busch (Chicago, Open Court Publishing Co., 1909).

reason mystics have found here a wide field for their theories and for many vagaries.

The problem of personality is really the problem of man in his individual and particular idiosyncrasy, and modern psychology shows how personality, the very self of man, is a rich complex of many noble qualities, the quintessence of nature's work at its best, and the highest efflorescence of the evolution of life. It incorporates volitions, ideas, and aspirations systematized into a unit by self-consciousness.

SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND SELF-EDUCATION.

Self-consciousness is a distinct prerogative of man. Lower creatures are sentient, the higher brute animals conscious, but man alone is self-conscious. He forms an idea of himself, and this idea of himself raises him above his bodily and temporary existence. It objectifies his own self in his mind and in this way man can reflect on himself and his own actions. He not only feels his own existence as do the higher animals, but he can say "I" and refers to himself as "me." He can speak of himself, he can compare himself with others, and he can judge himself. This makes it possible for him to wish to be different, and what Goethe says in his epigram is true enough of the average man, we might say of the natural man, but the higher man is not satisfied with his character, he aspires to some

better mode of existence. He endeavors to grow better and to improve himself.

In the growth of evolution self-consciousness rises as a new factor which makes it possible for the pace of progress, of intellectual and moral advance, to be greatly accelerated. The wish to know more and to be better and nobler gradually hardens into a stern determination and finally overrules the lower instincts inherited from a less cultured past.

A man who tries to do the right thing whenever he is confronted with duties is called "responsible," and the very thought that conscious endeavor is expected of him strengthens his responsibility. In this way man forms an ideal of what he ought to do and what he ought to be; and under the guidance of this ideal he can by conscious concentration work out the nobler potentialities of his self.

The German poet Friedrich Rückert says:

"Vor Jedem steht ein Bild
Des, das er werden soll,
Und eh' er es nicht ist,
Wird nicht sein Friede voll."

[The type he ought to be
Each one bears in his mind;
Until that be attained
He never peace will find.]

Responsibility is the divine stamp of man, the stamp of his nobility and of his dignity. Responsibility presupposes that a person is not like a brute

blindly obeying his instincts, but that he can restrain himself; that he does not heedlessly rush into committing a deed, but that he can deliberate and choose. Thus he does not depend upon the present only, but can take into consideration the eventualities of the future. He can make his action an expression, not of the fleeting moment, but of his entire character; he may let the better though more quiet motives have a chance to assert themselves against the lower impulses, even though these are louder and at times more vigorous. In a word, responsibility presupposes free will guided by moral principles, which means that we expect a person to make his decisions with the good intention of doing the right thing.

Briefly stated we say that a person is a human being; which means a rational creature, endowed with conscience and capable of acting on his own free will so that he can be held responsible for his deeds. Accordingly there are these four indispensable features in a person, rationality, conscience, responsibility and free will.

CONSCIENCE.

The good intention to do the right thing develops naturally and automatically in such a social being as man; it is called "conscience," which in a word may be described as the moral instinct of man.

Personality does not originate in isolation; every

person is a member of a social body, of a family, of a tribe, of social conditions, of a nation, of mankind, and a feeling of interdependence among all members of a society is present in every one of them from the beginning. Even a pack of wolves or dingos is animated in the chase by a common will, and this common will becomes a motive of action, which in human society assumes the authority of duty, of what man ought to do in the interest of all. The common will of a community develops instinctively through the demands made on the members of a social group. These demands, if not spontaneously attended to, are enforced by a consensus which finds a different expression in different stages of social development. The assent which an individual more or less consciously gives to the justice of the common will gradually takes shape in what is called conscience.³

FREE WILL AND RESPONSIBILITY.

Free will and determinism were formerly held to be irreconcilable, especially in the old theological disputations, but the difficulty is *de facto* a pseudo-problem.⁴ It is based upon a confusion of the ideas

³ For a description of the nature and origin of conscience, see the writer's *Ethical Problem*, pp. 119-124. The difference between the will of all and the common will is treated in *The Nature of the State*, pp. 15-16.

⁴ We have discussed it on former occasions in *Fundamental Problems*, pp. 191-196; *The Soul of Man*, pp. 389-397; *The Ethical Problem*, pp. 45-47; and *passim*.

of compulsion and determinedness. Freedom of will does not mean that the will is undetermined and indeterminate, a matter of haphazard chance like a throw of dice, but that it is *free to act according to its own nature*. An act of free will is the result neither of coercion nor of chance, but the necessary outcome of a free, that is to say an unhampered, decision, in which the determinant is the actor's own character.

He only who conceives of causation as a law in the sense of an enactment which enforces certain rules as a government would enforce its decrees through the power of police forces, can imagine that free actions in order to be truly free, are not, nor ought to be, determined by causation. But like all uniformities of nature, causation is called a law only in an allegorical sense. The so-called "laws of nature" and "the law of causation" are descriptions of how things behave under given conditions, and therefore they would better be called "uniformities." If without being compelled by any one else or any outside power, I act in such a way as to acknowledge the deed to be my own, it is called an act of my own free will, and since this will is of a definite kind and follows definite principles, it will under given conditions result in definite actions.

The same is true of unconscious nature. The path of a comet is determined according to the law of

gravitation through its mass, which under definite conditions takes a definite course with a definite velocity. It is the nature of the comet to behave in this way. The law of gravitation does not exercise the function of a cosmic police; it possesses no power and exercises no compulsion. It is merely a formula describing the action of gravity. If a comet could speak it would declare that it pursues a certain direction because it wishes to go there.

An act of free will is not an arbitrary deed which would form an exception to the law of cause and effect. An act of free will is as much determined by conditions as any other event, but the decisive factor in an act of free will is not any extraneous circumstance, but the character of the acting person. To state it briefly, we define "free will" as a will unimpeded by any compulsion.

An act of free will characterizes the person who performs it; it indicates what kind of a man he is. An act done under compulsion is foreign to the actor, and he can not be held accountable for it.

A person is expected to know that he has to stand by his deeds, and whenever he acts of his own free will he recognizes his deeds as his own, and thereby acquires the feeling of responsibility. A man in whom the feeling of responsibility is strong, will be careful so to act as not to regret or repent his action afterwards.

THE WORD PERSONA AND ITS HISTORY.

ETYMOLOGY OF THE WORD.

THE history of the word "person" is of great interest. To be sure the etymology is absolutely unknown, for the common derivation of classical tradition from *personare*, "to sound through," mentioned by Gellius (V, 7) is philologically impossible on account of the different quantity of the *o*. Nor is it likely that the word has been derived from *per-se-una*, "that which is one by itself," or formed by the suffix *ona*, as *per-se-ona*, "that which is self-containing," in analogy to *Pomona*, the fruit-containing one (the goddess of orchards), *Bellona*, the goddess of war, *matrona* etc. (Masculine analogies to nouns in *ona* are *patronus* and *colonus*.) But we know positively that *persona* was a term of the stage denoting the mask of an actor, the part he played, the rôle which he learned by heart—thoughts expressed in words accompanied by definite actions

THE ROMAN USE OF THE TERM.

It is noteworthy that the use of *persona* in the modern sense as a person (not as a mask on the stage)

is quite old and occurs as early as in Plautus (*Persa*, 783) where Dordalus, one of the characters of the play, swears "at the Persian, at all the Persians, and in fact at all persons."¹ The explanation that *personas* might here mean the masks on the stage is too far fetched to be entertained. While the pun suggests the use of the word person, the passage proves that the word was then used in its present acceptance.

The juridical usage of person, however, is isolated in classical times, and does not appear elsewhere in juridical writings. Even in the *Institutiones* of Gaius, its use is not far from the common acceptance of the word, and we read for instance (*Inst.*, III, 14, 2) that "an inheritance not yet entered upon still maintains the place of the person not of the future heir, but of the deceased."

There are only two places in which the word *persona* is used in a sense approaching our modern conception of a juridical person. These are found in Frontinus who speaks of *persona coloniae*, thus personifying a Roman colony, and in Agenius Urbicus who speaks of *personae publicae*, also called *coloniae*, which hold definite places assigned to them and are commonly named *praefecturae*.²

¹ See Schlossmann, *loc. cit.*, p. 15. The passage reads: "Qui illum Persam atque omnes Persas atque etiam omnes personas male di omnes perdant."

² The passage from Frontinus (*De controuv. agr.* II in *Röm. Feldmesser*, by Blume, Lachmann and Rudorff, I, pp. 54, 23)

HYPOSTASIS AND PROSOPON.

Among the authors of Greek antiquity we search in vain for a word that corresponds to the Latin *persona*. They used such words as "man" (*ἄνθρωπος* and *ἄνθρωπος*), and "soul" (*ψύχη*) to designate human beings or individuals, and not until the post-classical period were the words *hypostasis* and *prosopon* introduced as synonyms for *persona* by post-Hellenistic Christian theologians.

The word "hypostasis" is a philosophical term which gained currency among the Platonists and means "foundation." In common language it is used in the sense of pedestal or basis and denotes anything standing underneath and giving support to that which rests upon it. As a technical term of philosophy it smacks of metaphysics and means substratum. The world of the senses is assumed to be purely phenomenal, but behind or underneath

reads: "Est alia inscriptio quae—inscribitur 'Silva pascua' aut 'Fundus Septicianus, coloniae Augustae Concordiae.' Haec inscriptio videtur ad personam coloniae ipsius pertinere neque ullo modo abalienari potest a republica."

The passage in Agenius (8, 6; *loc. cit.*, I, p. 16) reads: "Quaedam loca feruntur ad publicam personam attinere, nam personae publicae etiam coloniae appellantur. Quae habent assignata in alienis finibus quaedam loca, quae solemus praefecturas appellare. Harum praefectarum proprietates manifeste ad colonos pertinent—sunt et aliae proprietates quae municipiis a principibus sunt concessae."

Another later quotation from Ulpianus (*Dig.* IV, 2, 9, 1) has been used for the same purpose but is less convincing. We shall quote it nevertheless. It reads: "et ideo si singularis sit persona, quae metum intulit vel populus vel curia vel collegium vel corpus, huic edicto locus erit."

lies the true reality, the hypostasis, which our mind reconstructs in the world of thoughts as *noumena*.

The word *prosopon* (like the Latin *facies* and the German *Antlitz* as well as *Gesicht*) means originally nothing but "face," and its use in the sense of "person" is late. When it does occur it is used in the same way as we say in English, "I saw many well-known faces," when we mean persons.

The use of the Greek *prosopon* has unquestionably been influenced by the Hebrew *panim*,³ where the word is used in a loose sense, frequently merely as a preposition "in the face of," meaning simply "in front of." This use of *prosopon* is late and does not antedate Christianity, but can be directly traced to quotations from the Septuagint.

In theology the term *hypostasis*, Latin *substantia*, "that which underlies," was used to denote the nature of the three aspects of the Trinity by the Latin Church Fathers, especially Tertullian who replaced this neo-Platonic term by *persona*. And here, in spite of the learned authority of Harnack and his followers,⁴ Professor Schlossmann is right in say-

³ פָּנִים. It is derived from פָּנָה which means "to turn." While the Hebrew term is a plurale tantum it is noteworthy that the Greek expression "in the face of" is always used in the singular. Cf. Luke ii. 31; x. 1. For further passages see Schlossmann, *loc. cit.*, pp. 53 ff., especially p. 55.

⁴ Harnack is supported by Loofs, *Realencyc. f. d. prot. Theol.* IV, p. 40; Bethune-Baker, "The Meaning of Homousios, in the Constantinopolitan Creed" in *Texts and Studies*, Vol. VII, pp. 21 ff.; Hatch, *Griechentum und Christentum* (Germ. tr. by

ing that Tertullian did not introduce the term *persona* from the nomenclature of jurisprudence, because it does not occur as a clearly defined term in juridical literature and its use in this sense as we saw above⁵ in Frontinus and Agenius Urbicus is only sporadic. If Tertullian had introduced the term from jurisprudence he would have said so, and accordingly there is no reason to assume that he did not use the word *persona* in the popularly accepted meaning.

During the time of ecclesiastical controversies concerning the nature of the Trinity, the Latin church insisted on the formula that God, Father, Son and Holy Ghost, are three persons and one substance, and not until then were the words *proso-pon* and *hypostasis* identified.

On the other hand the Greek idea *hypostasis* has influenced the conception of *persona* which appears mainly in the oldest definition of the word still extant as given by Boethius who introduces the term *substantia*, the Latin translation of *hypostasis*, saying:

“Quocirca si persona in solis substantiis est atque in his rationalibus, substantiaque omnis natura est,

E. Preuschen), pp. 206 ff. He is opposed by Esser in Wetzer and Welte's *Kirchenlex.*, XI², p. 142, 2; Bardenhewer, *Geschichte der altkirchlichen Literatur*, II², p. 388; and Seeberg, *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte*, I, p. 87; and by Schlossmann himself, from whom we quote this bibliographic note.

⁵ See page 13.

nec in universalibus sed in individuis constat, reperta personae est igitur definitio: Persona est naturae rationalis individua substantia.”

[If therefore person exists only in substances, and indeed in rational substances, and if every nature⁶ is substance, and if it does not consist in universals but in individuals, the definition of a person is as follows: Person is the substance of an individual rational nature.]

Other definitions, especially that of Cassiodorus, repeat the same idea in somewhat different form: “Persona vero hominis est substantia rationalis individua suis proprietatibus a consubstantialibus caeteris segregata.”

[The person of a man, however, is a rational individual substance which in its properties is separate from other fellow substances.]

The identification of two different terms such as *hypostasis* or *substantia* and *persona* indicate the presence of two currents of thought, one philosophical the other mystico-religious, which were finally merged into one; but the differences blazed forth in the animosity of the *furor theologicus* recorded in ecclesiastical history. The differences continue even to the present time though they find other terms as exponents of two contradictory views.

⁶ Note the peculiar use of the word *natura* which might be translated “creature.”

The controversy was set at rest by repeated official declarations that the quarrel was purely verbal, and so we find both *prosopon* and *hypostasis* repeatedly used together with ἦτοι or ἡγουν, as if to emphasize that the two terms mean exactly the same. In Latin ecclesiastical manuscripts the two words are used synonymously in the same manner: *personae seu subsistentiae* or *personae vel subsistentiae*.⁷

MAX MUELLER AND TRENDELENBURG.

Prof. F. Max Müller wrote a short essay on the subject of personality and published it under the title *Persona*.⁸ He accepts the traditional etymology of *persona* as a mask and interprets the meaning of "person" in a dualistic sense, assuming that behind the mask or *persona* there is an actor, and this is the real person.

In this interpretation, however, Max Müller is mistaken. A person *is* the part which a man plays in life; he *is* the character which, as it were, he acts. His person manifests itself in the sentiments which sway him, in the deeds he performs and in the words he says. Our sentiments, thoughts, words and deeds

⁷ Some theologians, for instance the Roman Diaconus Rusticus, in his *Disputatio contra Acephalos*, use *subsistentia* in place of the more common *substantia* in order to give more dignity to the term, which in its abbreviated form had ceased to mean "that which underlies" and was commonly used in the sense of "substance."

⁸ Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1908.

form an harmonious whole, they constitute a systematic unity, and in this their totality they constitute our personality; they are our self.

Every one of us plays his own part in life. He is the actor who acts himself. In other words he has not memorized a part which some one else has conceived and written down. He is the poet who improvises the rôle which under given situations he wants to have performed. The part which a man plays is of his own making. However, Max Müller conceives a person not as the part he plays, but as the actor only. He distinguishes between the two and regards the part which a person plays in life as a performance that is foreign to him. While in real life a man is the part he plays in the world, the actor on the stage may be very different from it. For instance he who plays Judas Iscariot in the passion play at Oberammergau, may have nothing in common with the character of the betrayer of Jesus.

Max Müller's view is dualistic. Following the speculations of the old Brahman Vedantism, he conceives of the soul as a metaphysical being behind our actual existence, as thing-in-itself, a passive witness, and a mere spectator. We will let him explain his view in his own words. He says: "Let us remember that *persona* had two meanings, that it meant originally a mask, but that it soon came to

be used as the name of the wearer of the mask. Knowing how many ambiguities of thought arose from this, we have a right to ask: Does our personality consist in the *persona* we are wearing, in our body, our thoughts, or does our true personality lie somewhere else? It may be that at times we so forget ourselves, our true self, as to imagine that we are Romeo and Juliet, King Lear, or Prince Hamlet. Nor can we doubt that we are responsible each for his own *dramatis persona*, that we are hissed or applauded, punished or rewarded, according as we act the part allotted to us in this earthly drama, badly or well. But the time comes when we awake, when we feel that not only our flesh and our blood, but all that we have been able to feel, to think and to say, was outside our true self; that we were witnesses, not actors; and that before we can go home, we must take off our masks, standing like strangers on a strange stage, and wondering how for so long a time we did not perceive even within ourselves the simple distinction between *persona* and *persona*, between the mask and the wearer."

The truth is that if life is to be compared to a stage we play our own parts, and the characters which we represent exhibit our own personality. On the stage the actor behaves as his part demands. His part does not belong to him; the poet is responsible for it, not the actor who has learned it by heart

and speaks it by rote. In actual existence the mask and the actor are one and the same; the parts we play are not foreign to us, as Max Müller claims, but they are the true and only expressions of our inmost being, of our personality.

It has become customary during the last century to study the history of an idea in order to understand both its origin and meaning, and in this sense the late Professor Trendelenburg has approached the problem of the significance of personality. He has collected the most essential particulars on the etymology of the term and its historical interrelation with the Greek *πρόσωπον*; and he alludes also to the theological idea of the Trinity as one substance in three persons, etc. In a word, he offers in his essay "On the History of the Word Person."⁹ a good collection of the most essential philological and etymological data which have reference to the formation and interpretation of the word "person."

GIERKE AND SCHLOSSMANN.

This essay of Trendelenburg's remained buried among other posthumous papers for many years and has only recently been published. In the meantime Dr. Otto Gierke, professor of German Civil and State Law at the University of Berlin, has set forth

⁹ An English translation of the essay appeared in *The Monist*, July, 1910, and has been separately published by the Open Court Publishing Co.

for judicial purposes a doctrine as to the nature of person, which he calls the "organic theory." Under this he subsumes not only living individuals but also juridical persons, and he speaks of person in this sense as "a life unit which withdraws itself absolutely from sense perceptions." He adds, "And even his [an actual man's] personality is an attribute attached to this invisible unit which is simply deduced from its effects. It is a crude error to think that a separate personality can be seen with bodily eyes."¹⁰

Prof. Sigmund Schlossmann of Kiel takes issue with this organic theory, and going to the other extreme criticises it as a nuisance (*Schädling*) which has burdened jurisprudence with the fictitious existence of a juridical agent endowed with legal functions, and ought to be set aside. In a scholarly essay entitled *Persona und πρόσωπον*, Professor Schlossmann has collected almost all the philological material on hand and fulminates his anathema against Gierke's view. He certainly succeeds in proving that the Latin *persona* is not a translation of the Greek *prosōpon*, but that both words have developed independently into the meaning of person, influencing each other as two electric currents affect each other by induction (*loc. cit.*, p. 99). In truth the word

¹⁰ *Das Wesen der menschlichen Verbände; Rectoratsrede*, 1902, p. 18.

acquired the meaning of person only under the influence of the Latin conception of *persona*, and this was done not on the ground of juridical considerations but of theological discussion on the nature of the Trinity. Wherever *prosopon* is used in the sense of *persona*, or *aprosopos* in the sense of not having a *persona*, we can point out an actual or highly probable influence of Latin thought upon the author who thus uses these words. Professor Schlossmann shows that Dionysius of Halicarnassus had become accustomed to this convenient term during a sojourn at Rome of more than twenty years. Herennius Modestinus, however, was practically a Roman who wrote in Greek, and so his use of *prosopon* in the sense of *persona* may be regarded as a Latinism.¹¹

According to Schlossmann the importance of the term *persona* in antiquity has been greatly exaggerated since it appears to have meant merely one who plays a part, so that the expression "slaves are not persons" simply meant that slaves played no part before the law, their rights were ignored by the law. It is noteworthy that the Greek *aprosopos* occurs in Theophilus who has obviously been influenced by the Roman usage of the word *persona*.

The history of the theological use of the term "person" certainly proves that the idea of personality with reference to the deity is rather late and

¹¹ See Schlossmann, *loc. cit.*, pp. 47-48.

leaves to those who object to the use of the term the excuse of being the result of ecclesiastical quibbles, in which two such different terms as *hypostasis* which means substratum and *persona* which means an individual being, have for insufficient reasons been finally declared identical.

THE PROBLEM OF UNITY.

PERSON NOT A METAPHYSICAL UNITY.

A PERSON is an individual that is possessed of reason. It is a social being, which means that it is a member of a community, endowed with speech as the means of a communication of thought, and conscious of rights as well as duties, capable of pursuing purposes, and responsible for its actions—all important facts. But we want to know what personality is, how it originates and what it signifies.

If we adopt the old Brahman idea as advocated by Max Müller we would be compelled to believe that what we call “person” is a mysterious agent behind all the characteristics and deeds of a personality. If that were truly so all persons would be of equal value, for they are mere spectators, and what they are to do in life concerns them as little as the actor can be held personally responsible for the crimes he commits on the stage when performing the part assigned to him.

Buddhism denied the Brahman view of the meta-

physical nature of the self, and modern psychology, sometimes erroneously called the psychology without a soul, follows the same line of argument in denying the existence of a soul in itself. According to this view a person consists of his thoughts and volitions. He is not the owner of his qualities but the sum total of them all. The Brahman view originated through a philosophical mistake which hypostasizes the idea of the thing and treats it as a thing-in-itself. Nevertheless it would be a great mistake to regard unities as nonentities, as empty combinations, or unsubstantial shadows.

It is a common habit to say that the tree has roots, a trunk, foliage, blossoms and fruit, while in fact the tree is an organized whole, the organs of which are its essential constituents. Lowell says:

“Roots, wood, bark and leaves, singly perfect may be,
But clapped hodge-podge together, they don’t make a tree.”

We say that a table has legs, and a top; that a wagon has wheels, a body and a tongue; but we ought to say that these objects consist of their several parts. They are combinations, and this very combination makes the thing what it is.

The unity of a personality is of high importance but it is no more mysterious than the unity of a watch, or of an engine, or of a dynamo. The organs must be grouped in a definite way in order to produce the unity; otherwise they will not interact.

THE UNITY OF AN ORGANISM.

Every person is a unity, yet this unity is not an unchangeable monad but the complicated system of a rich manifold, and the basis of a person's unity is physiological. Several organs and their functions have been combined into a higher unity by organization. Physiological data as to the origin and development of a personality teach us that the unity is a product of the cooperative tendency of an organism, of a complex which has to act in unison.

An organism grows. Every animal has developed from a cell by multiplication and all its parts are differentiated by a division of labor. The archetype is preserved in all of them, every organ being adapted to the work allotted to it by the nature of circumstances. It is a matter of course therefore that all parts harmonize. The roots, stem, leaves, flowers and fruits of a plant show a certain agreement because they have all originated from the same pattern. They are mere modifications of the original design, and the various functions cooperate in the service of the whole.

The cooperation of parts in animal organisms is more systematized than in plants. The different organs of a creature possessed of purpose, are so closely united that they must act in concert. They are no longer coordinated but subjected to a central-

ized government. The limbs are subservient to the purpose of the whole evinced in volitions which have their seat in the brain whence orders are issued for general cooperation. This systematization is carried to a still higher perfection in man, the rational animal who by the machinery of speech acquires the faculty of thinking in abstract terms, and thus is capable of testing his own concepts and reaches an objective comprehension of facts. Man learns to distinguish between truth and error, between right and wrong, between good and evil, and in his decision and deeds he is expected to use the best judgment of which he is capable.

Not all men are consistent; some vacillate to an extraordinary degree. But upon the whole, there is a general convergence of impulses in the mental makeup of everybody, which in spite of some contradictory tendencies produces a unity of volition and furnishes the basis of what may briefly be called character. All the doings and inclinations, the preferences and tastes of a man, are as much in agreement as are the roots, leaves, flowers and fruits of a plant. There is a type which pervades the several parts, and this type reappears in the unification of the whole, where it effectually dominates the entire attitude and behavior of the individual. This is the keynote of a man's personality, and by

a "man of personality" we mean a person whose character is clearly determined and well defined.

THE WILL AND THE INTELLECT.

In a person the dominant feature is registered in his will, but the will of intellectual persons is guided by the mind, which means that their decisions are influenced by rational deliberation.

The pragmatic view, so fashionable now, describes the actual state of things on the lower plane of mankind. Its founder took a dislike to the intellect and opened a campaign against what he called "vicious intellectualism." William James was satisfied to point out the power of "the will to believe," but neglected to inquire into the rare cases of the influence of the still small voice of the intellect which modifies and even radically changes the belief, yea the character of a man in spite of his will. As a psychology, pragmatism presents us with a correct, or fairly correct, picture of the average type of man, but as a philosophy it is a failure because it treats the average as the standard and overlooks the existence of a higher type.

In the realm of science the supremacy of the will is sheer atavism, for it represents man as he has just emerged from brute existence; when man ceases to be a slave of his instincts, a child of blind impulses, when he begins to be influenced by his intel-

lect, when he begins to learn the lessons of life, when he forms ideals and aspires for higher aims, when he considers his highest duty to be self-education, and an actualization of his higher potentialities, when he feels responsibilities—then only does he become a person in the full sense of the word.

THE WILL AND THE EGO-CONSCIOUSNESS.

Man's soul is like a commonwealth of sensations, notions, ideas, and other psychic functions. Man's will is like a king within it. The will decides, the will acts, and the will is always inclined to assert itself irrespective of other considerations. A man of the lower type will follow the first impulse if it be strong enough at a given moment; but in a higher man the will is like a constitutional king who waits with his decision until he has taken counsel with his trusted minister of state, and has become assured of the general assent of the nation. A wise man refrains from rushing into acts. In him the first impulse is checked by some such thought as, "Wait, let me consider the consequences." The counsel which a ruler takes is comparable to the intellect, or the mind; and the higher mankind rises in the scale of evolution, the stronger grows this power of inhibition, resulting in what ethicists call "self-control" in consequence of which the influence of the mental process of deliberation increases.

The intellect is not a faculty any more than is the will, but it is a collective name for the sum total of experiences as arranged in a systematic order. There is no special faculty called the will. By will psychologists understand "the tendency to pass into act." A motor idea when stimulated one way or another, innervates its respective set of muscles and makes them contract, thus serving the purpose of the acting person. The tension preceding the act, at the moment of its release, is called "will." But it is essential that the process should not be purely physiological but must pass into consciousness—the domain of psychology—while touching the motor idea. In order to render an act of the will complete, the motor idea should be associated with the ego conception expressed in the word "I" which, as it were, sanctions its passing into act by thinking "I will it." Should a stimulus leading to a muscular motion be purely physiological, the process would not be an act of the will, but a mere reflex action.

Though the will is not a faculty we can speak of the attitude of the ego consciousness when allowing motor ideas to pass into act, as "will."

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF UNITY.

There have always been two philosophical parties neither of which possesses the full truth. In the Middle Ages they were called realists and nominal-

ists. There are always thinkers who believe in the realities of things-in-themselves. They assume that unities possess an existence of their own, that they are entities of a mysterious kind; while their adversaries deny the very existence of things and look upon them as mere words whose significance lies solely in our subjective conception. The truth lies between these extremes. Certain combinations produce unities possessed with new qualities, and wherever we have a new quality we are sure that the combination represents a true unity which in itself is of actual significance.

Two lines which cross each other produce an angle. The nature of an angle can not be deduced from the nature of a straight line. It is something absolutely new. It is the result of a combination.

The same is true of the triangle. A triangle is not the sum of three lines but a combination of them resulting in a figure with new properties, and how rich the products of this simple combination are is known to the student of geometry and trigonometry.

The unity of a thing is real enough. It is not merely due to a subjective and arbitrary conception of the mind, but it has an objective significance. On the other hand neither is unity a thing in itself, nor is it a metaphysical entity. There is not a metaphysical entity called "wind," that performs

the function of "blowing" and causes the commotion of the air, but this commotion of the air, the blowing of the wind, is the wind itself. In the same way the cooperation of all the organs is the organism. There is not an organism in itself, there is not a life principle, or a metaphysical self (called *atman* by the Vedanta philosopher) which animates the several organs, but the cooperation of all the organs produces that organized whole which we call the entire organism. The organs have originated through a differentiation of function and in their combination they produce a higher unity. It is true enough that a unity existed before, for instance first in the undivided cell, but the higher unity, or generally stated the gradation of the unity of an organism from a lower to a higher range, is always a product or an effect, not a cause; it is due to the cooperation of its parts. It is therefore wrong to assume a mysterious entity or a metaphysical essence which constitutes the unities of things and assumes a mysterious principle to account for the non-material interrelations of parts which produce new and higher unities.

Turning to the other side, we are confronted with a theory that disregards the significance of pure form and would accept only materiality as real and significant. The materialist who in judging of the value of a statue would only take cognizance of the

metal of which it is made and who would measure its worth by taking its weight, disregarding its shape and showing no appreciation for its beauty, is incapable of seeing that the combination of several factors produces a new thing.

The whole intellectual world with all its wonders rises from combinations of very simple and elementary factors of feelings, and the final result is that wonderful product which we call personality in which the eternal laws of being are reflected.

The nature of unity is due to the laws of form as is most clearly exemplified in the geometrical instance of the triangle resulting from a combination of three lines.

THE UNITY OF A CHINESE MYSTIC.

While appreciating the significance of form and formal laws as developed in pure logic and pure mathematics and not accepting any mystical theory of the universe, we now nevertheless comprehend what mystics mean when they are overawed by the profundity of the significance of unity, of that mysterious item which produces new values through a mere combination of parts.

The old philosopher of China, Lao-tze, has much to say on unity. He declares (Chap. 42) that unity is begotten of reason, and that the immaterial presence in the material world, the mysterious something

which is colorless, and soundless (or inaudible), and incorporeal (or impalpable), constitutes a oneness (Chap. 14). He praises heaven and earth, minds and valleys (Chap. 39), on account of their oneness, the valleys as the place where the water is collected; and he promises that he who attains oneness shall not be subject to dissolution (Chap. 10).

Chapter 39 contains a hymn on oneness which we quote in full:

"From of old these things have obtained oneness:

" 'Heaven through oneness has become pure.
Earth through oneness can endure.
Minds through oneness their souls procure.
Valleys through oneness repletion secure.

" 'All creatures through oneness to life have been called.
And kings were through oneness as models installed.'

"Such is the result of oneness.

" 'Were heaven not pure it might be rent.
Were earth not stable it might be bent.
Were minds not ensouled they'd be impotent.
Were valleys not filled they'd soon be spent.

" 'When creatures are lifeless who can their death prevent?
Are kings not models, but on haughtiness bent,
Their fall, forsooth, is imminent.' "

Incidentally we may add that mystics, and among them Lao-tze, next to unity stand in awe of trinity. In Chapter 42 this sage of China says: "Reason begets unity, unity begets duality, duality begets trinity, and trinity begets all the myriad creatures."

UNITY A PROBLEM OF FORM.

The key to the solution of all problems lies in the nature of form. The formal is not without good reason called in Greek the causative, τὸ αἰτιῶδες.

We generalize relations into formulas, such as the law of gravitation, and we know that these formulas are mental symbols, not realities, but the relations themselves are objective conditions, and as such they are efficient factors in the world of realities. Matter and energy constitute the concrete objectivity of existence, yet neither matter nor energy, but these relations and formal conditions, these combinations and the way in which they are grouped and cooperate, are the determinants which decide the course of events. They appear as the cosmic order, they make reason possible, they give direction to life, they produce purpose-endowed creatures and represent the divinity of existence. For this reason we deem it not inappropriate to use the terms of religious conceptions, such as God, soul, and immortality, but it will be noticed that all the religious terms thus employed and thus justified find a rigorously scientific explanation.

We anticipate that the extremists on both sides will be little satisfied with our methods, but we are confident that those representatives of either party who see deeper will join us, and in the propositions

here represented they will find the true solution of an old problem that has vexed mankind for milleniums.

Readers somewhat acquainted with the history of philosophy will notice that the treatment of the idea of personality here attempted constitutes a reconciliation between the two opposed views, the mystico-religious interpretation of facts, and the rigidly scientific conception, either of which in its extreme formulation must be regarded as contradictory to the other. We claim that both, if rightly understood, come to the same conclusion, so they are complementary, the one to the other, and emphasize two truths—two truths which form a contrast without being contradictory to each other, each of which by itself being onesided, and so the two demand each other for the sake of completeness.

The unity of a thing such as a watch is something new, and so is the unity of a person. The watch is worth more than the sum of all its parts. It can accomplish results and perform functions which are brought about by a proper cooperation of all parts. This may appear mysterious but it is quite intelligible. It is the old problem of quality solved by a consideration of the nature of form.¹ The phenomena of existence can not be explained by weighing and measuring, by counting quantities, but by esti-

¹ "The Significance of Quality," *Monist*, XV, 375.

mating the nature of combinations as resulting in higher unities; and this truth applies also to the origin and significance of personality.

According to conditions the unity of every personality is more or less significant. Sometimes the very systematic nature of a man's personality adds to the value of his character by giving to it its proper setting and interrelation with his thoughts. However, the unity of a person, like the unity of all things, is a unification; and since a unification consists of qualities we shall readily understand that a person is not a special being or essence but the harmonious combination of parts in an organized form, and that the worth of a personality can depend only on its character, its contents, its ideas and aims. We range one person higher than another if his character is superior, if his intelligence is higher, if his sentiments are more humane and refined.

IDEAS INTERPERSONAL.

THE CONSTITUENTS OF THE SOUL.

FOR an analysis of the nature of personality it is most indispensable to understand the part played by ideas in the economy of our mental life.

It is natural that, misled by the customs of language, we fall into the mistake of the ancient Brahmans in imagining that we *have* ideas. Though we consist of ideas, we objectify them and treat them as if they were commodities. We say that we "adopt" opinions as if we appropriated them. But the truth is the reverse. Ideas, opinions, or convictions take possession of us, sometimes against our will, which means against the conviction which we held before, or properly speaking which was in possession of our soul.

Our soul is the battle-ground where conflicting views are waging a bitter warfare for the supremacy among many contrary volitions. Our mind is like a commonwealth inhabited by various ideas. These ideas combine and produce new ideas. At the same time, experience as well as intercommunication with

others introduces immigrants. New ideas enter. Sometimes they are invaders, and if these immigrants are at variance with those ideas that are in possession, parties are formed and a civil war arises until either a compromise is made or one side becomes dominant. When a powerful invader is victorious, we have an instance in which we become converts to a new conviction in spite of ourselves.

Ideas lead lives of their own. They grow and develop. They migrate from soul to soul. They are transferred by the way of speech and through writing. They often originate as vague dreamlike phantoms, but they grow in distinctness and are often contrasted to or joined with other ideas. In the course of their migration they become more or less modified and adapt themselves to new environments. They struggle among themselves. Some are victorious, others succumb; some are exterminated, others survive. They fit themselves into a system in which some of them take the lead while others remain subservient.

Ideas are the most potent factors in the history of mankind. Wherever they reside in human souls they are aglow with life and sentiment. But in their transmigration they may be conveyed by mechanical means in script; they may shrivel up into small inky letters on paper and in this shape they may lie concealed in unfeeling forms of dead mat-

ter. They may be incorporated in books or manuscripts or other symbols, they may find expression in art; and yet like grains of seed which fall into fertile soil, they may revive whenever they impress themselves through the senses into the brain of a living being. Indeed ideas are wonderful things, for they are the vehicles of all spirituality.

THE LIFE OF IDEAS.

In order fully to understand our own personality we ought to be able to trace back the life of the ideas of which our souls are composed to their very origins, and to their most primitive original conditions which always start in sensation, or, broadly speaking, in making experience. They coalesce with and draw conclusions from previous experience, or react somehow on the impressions of the surrounding world. They suck strength from our very wants (for our desires stir us to deeds) and in so doing they give meaning to life.

Without going astray or being fantastical we may compare ideas to real persons. At least the life of a person is quite similar to the fate of ideas, and there can hardly be a more appropriate comparison to characterize their being. Think only of moral ideas, of ideals, or religious sentiments! They enter the soul of a man and take hold of his entire existence often in spite of his will. And what a profound

truth lies in the dogma of resurrection! Jesus the Crucified has actually risen from the dead, and where two or three are gathered together in his name, he is present.

* * *

The behavior of ideas is rather impersonal, and we may characterize them as interpersonal existences. Lichtenberg, a contemporary of Kant, struck the right chord when he objected to the expression, "I think," and claimed that we should say, "it is thinking" just as we say, "it is raining" or "it is snowing" or "it is thundering." It is a fallacy to imagine that there is a certain I, an ego who does the thinking. This is the old metaphysical mistake. The truth is that thoughts arise in living beings according to conditions. There is no ego that produces thoughts, but *thinking takes place*, and in the process of thinking, thoughts are shaped. We do not deny that the conception of the ego is a highly important contrivance in the household of nature to render thinking possible. But the ego is after all not the cause of our personality but the result and product of it.

The ego is the center of the commonwealth of ideas, and this position gives it its prominent and somewhat exaggerated significance.

The ego represents the sum total and summary of the component parts of a person, and is used in

this sense as a synonym for personality. The word "I" is a pronoun standing, like "he" or "she," for a noun, and the noun thus stood for is always the speaking person. It is an illusive word, its meaning changing with the speaker, but in itself it is as empty as the unmeaning "it."

The ego identifies itself in different persons with different ideas which dominate the commonwealths of their souls. Ideas themselves however are representatives either of concrete things or classes of things, or of the interrelations among things, or of aspirations and plans to accomplish certain aims.

GAUGE OF WORTH, THE LOGOS.

We have seen that to every one his personality must be higher than all his possessions, because it constitutes the man himself, the owner of all his earthly goods. Thus it is obvious that the worth of one's personality is not only more valuable than any property, but it is also different in kind. In the history of mankind the recognition of the dignity of personality shows itself in our legal and habitual notions of respect for human lives. It is considered a duty at any cost to save or rescue a man who is in danger of death, and in comparison to the jeopardy of human life all commercial goods and their values are deemed a negligible quantity.

Kant in his definition of personality declares that

a person should always be considered as an end in itself, and this holds good for our own person as in the case of other persons with whom we are dealing.

We ask now, Is every personality of equal dignity? and if not, this leads to the further question, What is the objective standard of the worth of personality?

The rationality of a person's mental operations means that his soul has become an incarnation of the world order, the universal logic of natural law, the eternal norm of existence called in the terminology of Christian doctrines, the Logos. In this sense we must look upon the Logos as a standard of man's dignity. It is the measure of his worth—in a word, truth is the gauge of man. The Logos includes the recognition of moral obligation, popularly called conscience, and constitutes the divinity of man which is forfeited only by those who in their deeds prove that they themselves do not respect the dignity of personality in others, that for selfish reasons they would not shrink from taking the life of one of their fellow men.

When we consider the composite nature of personality we become aware of the fact that different persons are different in character and mental equipment. Nor are they equal in worth, and their comparative superiority can be measured by the general

desirability of their moral and mental capacity together with a consideration of the strength, seriousness etc., of their intentions and volitions. The nearer a man is to the Logos the nearer he is to the ideal of humanity. In other words, the more of truth has become incarnate in his mind, the higher he ranges in the scale of dignity.

It is understood that the determination of this rank of persons is no easy matter, because the constitution of a person is too complicated and the several ingredients are difficult to judge. Virtues are frequently offset by faults and there are values of another kind than truth, such as perseverance, strength of will, intensity of emotion, and especially a natural disposition to good will. It is far more easy to determine the value of all the ingredients of a personality, which are the ideas, aspirations and emotions of which the soul consists.

SUPERPERSONALITIES.

THE ORIGIN OF SUPERPERSONALITY.

A PERSON is a systematic arrangement of ideas, sentiments, hopes and volitions. We have seen that ideas are interpersonal beings migrating from soul to soul. We will now call attention to a subject very much neglected and frequently misunderstood, which is the part played by superpersonalities.

In the development of mankind we frequently meet with institutions such as the church or the state, and also systematized sets of truths, such as the several sciences, mathematics, astronomy, chemistry, etc. These systems of ideas, whether purely theoretical as the sciences, or incarnate in institutions such as states, churches, etc., possess a life of their own. They are not limited to science, religion and politics but deal also with business and any other possible affairs. Every municipality has a character of its own, and the same is true of business concerns, factories, corporations, societies and even clubs. They are, as it were, superpersonalities

which consist of persons and continue to preserve their character even when old members are replaced by new ones. Such superpersonalities are not non-existent, they originate, grow and prosper more or less. Though corporations are said to have no souls, each one is possessed of a definite character, and different corporations differ in dignity and other qualities as much as individuals.

It is important for us to understand the significance of superpersonalities because without a due appreciation of them we can have no scientific comprehension of either religion or patriotism.

Superpersonalities are organisms whose union consists in the relations that obtain between several persons. In other words they are due to the alliance of many individuals into a complex body, a society or company. Such are for instance juridical persons. They are frequently called artificial personalities, because they are made by law. But even a superficial consideration will prove that they are of natural growth and that the law only ratifies their existence and superintends their transactions.

Superpersonalities rise naturally at the very dawn of anthropogeny, for the common aspirations and communal work of primitive man beget language, and language itself is a superpersonality. Interpersonal ideas naturally beget superpersonalities.

Juridical persons are only one and perhaps the

best known kind of superpersonalities, for there are others whose character has never been considered by psychologists. Foremost among them we may mention the efforts made by mankind on definite lines of progress, as for instance aviation.

The art of aviation presupposes a development of ideas actualized in experiments or inventions, the main phases of which are indicated by the names of Lilienkron, Langley and the Wright brothers, thereafter finding innumerable representatives. The art, however, is a kind of intellectual organism whose growth is of an interpersonal, and whose final completion is of a superpersonal nature.

A DESCRIPTION OF SUPERPERSONALITIES.

The manner in which persons are associated is by no means indifferent. How important superpersonal interrelations in politics¹ appear when we consider that it is of great consequence how citizens are united into states, whether in the shape of a republic, or an absolute monarchy, or a constitutional government, and every form of a national constitution has the tendency of self-preservation which, however, is subject to modification through natural growth—sometimes through revolution.

If superpersonalities enter into history as domi-

¹ Compare the author's treatise on *The Nature of the State*, Chicago, Open Court Publishing Co., 1894.

nant principles we speak of them as "historical movements." If they take shape in visible form, if buildings and property are set aside for their uses, or if in their interest duties are assigned to officers, we speak of them as "institutions"; if they are types set forth for imitation we call them "ideals," and if they are chartered by law and have their functions duly determined they become "juridical persons." At any rate they differ greatly in dignity and may be as flippant in character as a bridge-club, or as serious as a church, or as awe-inspiring as a god of pagan antiquity.

There ought to be founded a special branch of psychology to determine the constitution, logic and sentiments of superpersonal presences. To some extent, but not altogether, it would be identical with, or at least similar to, the psychology of the masses. We must bear in mind that the psychological aspect of a superpersonal presence consists in certain brain structures distributed over a greater or less number of persons who are inspired with the same or similar principles and tendencies, and so they cooperate in more or less clearly defined concerted actions.

GODS AS SUPERPERSONAL PRESENCES.

It is typical of the human mind to personify the powers and laws of nature, such as the thun-

derstorm, the sun, the moon, the sky, the ocean, etc., and also the factors of human society, courage, wisdom, science, warfare, who appear in poetic figures as Zeus, Athene, Vulcan, Mars, Venus and the other gods of the pagan pantheons. These conceptions have been as influential in the life of the several nations as if they had been living beings guiding and directing those who believed in their existence. In this sense we must look upon them not as mere fiction, but as real and definite agencies whose nature is of higher consequence than even historical personalities, leaders in peace and war, and law-givers; they are truly superpersonal presences.

On the other hand there are historical personages who for some reason or other are transfigured after death into superpersonal presences. The mortal coil is shuffled off and they become paragons of the virtue or the ideal which in some way or other they have come to represent. This idealization of historical persons takes place everywhere in history, and we can observe the process even now. Bismarck has become the Paladin of German unity, and it was quite appropriate to represent him in a colossal statue as the figure of the mythical Roland. In the United States Washington has received a similar veneration and the same happens over and over again in all climes and countries. Even a liv-

ing man still dwelling with us in the body may be dignified by coming to stand for a superpersonal idea. Alexander the Great very adroitly had himself worshiped as the son of the god Ammon, and even in his coins he carries the rams' horns which symbolize this belief. Napoleon instinctively, perhaps purposely and shrewdly, imitated his example and managed to have the press of the day picture and characterize him as a kind of reincarnation of Cæsar.

As a rule, however, a person is thus dignified only after his death. Indeed he frequently comes to be revered as such a superpersonal ideal by suffering martyrdom for a great cause; and Schiller says truly:

“Denn was ewig im Gesang soll leben
Muss auf Erden untergehen.”

[What in song shall live forever
Perisheth on earth below.]

The figures of the polytheistic gods are but little appreciated to-day. They are superpersonalities that now have passed away or have lost much of their vitality. Historians in ancient Greece and in modern times have investigated whether or not Heracles existed, where he may have lived, and whether there is any historical nucleus of his labors. At the time when paganism broke down people began to doubt the historicity of Heracles. Then this super-

personal figure of the Greek hero began to fade in the memory of the people. Such is the decay and sometimes the death of superpersonalities. The hero died and was supplanted by other ideals offered in the growth of a new religion called Christianity.

During the prime of Greek civilization, Heracles was by no means a nonentity. He was an important factor in the intellectual and moral life of Greece. He moulded the character of young men. He inspired them with motives of high courage and other virtues, and in the same way all of the gods must be regarded as superpersonalities who were no mean presences in the life of the nation where they prevailed.

THE CHRIST IDEAL A SUPERPERSONALITY.

From such considerations we must also approach the superpersonalities of the Christian faith, especially the figure of Christ. From this standpoint we shall understand that in a certain sense and for the main purpose, which is the inspiring influence of the Christ ideal in the hearts of believers, it is quite indifferent whether or not Jesus was an historical person.

Jesus the Galilean who lived nineteen centuries ago in an obscure corner of Palestine can be of no possible use to us unless he becomes a real presence in our lives, and this means that he must be raised

to the power and dignity of a superpersonality—of an ideal which to the dull eye of the uninitiated seems to be a mere nonentity, but is in truth a guidance for our conduct and a dominating factor in our lives.

THE TRINITY CONCEPTION.

THE TRI-UNITY OF GOD.

RELIGIOUS thought has produced a peculiar superpersonal God-conception in the Trinity, and it is certainly not accidental that several otherwise very different faiths reach a remarkable agreement on this point.

The God of Christianity¹ has supplanted the ancient gods of paganism, and we can understand why he has been so much more potent than they. He does not represent one or another power of nature. He stands for the totality of all that exists and also the creative faculty which has produced the world and continues to mould it.

The Church Fathers, as well as the Christian philosophers who succeeded them, especially Athanasius, Augustine, Anselm, and Thomas Aquinas, worked out the doctrine of Christian philosophy. They gave considerable thought to the idea of per-

¹ As to the reality of God and further details of a scientific God conception see the author's book on *God, An Inquiry Into the Nature of Man's Highest Ideal and a Solution of the Problem from the Standpoint of Science*, Chicago, Open Court Publishing Co., 1908.

sonality, and after many internal struggles finally shaped the conception of this highest superpersonal presence in the doctrine of the Trinity, or more properly speaking Tri-Unity, of God.

The orthodox churches insist most vigorously on the dogma that God is one and only one, but at the same time there is in God a trinity of persons, which means that the deity manifests itself in three modes, and each mode constitutes a unity in itself. Each is a complete spiritual organism.

The doctrine that God consists of three persons who are one in substance has roused much opposition among rationalists who look upon it as an illogical proposition. But they forget that religious doctrines are symbols which can not be measured by the common rules of logic.

THE BUDDHIST TRIKAYA.

It is well known that the Buddhists too believe in a Trinity which consists of the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Sangha, i. e., (1) the Enlightened Teacher, (2) the Truth, and (3) the Brotherhood or Church. It is called the *Triratna* or the "three jewels," and is conceived as three personalities, called the *Tri-kâya*, or in Chinese 三身 *san shan*. Not unlike the Christian Trinity, the three persons of the Buddhist Tri-kâya represent the three phases or aspects of

God, or whatever we may call the object of religious worship.

In the Mahayâna doctrine the three *kâyas* are thus described: the Dharmakâya, the body of the good law, is the system of all religious doctrines; the Nirmanakâya or the body of transformations, is the development of truth in the evolution of life finding its climax in the personality of a Buddha; and the Sambhogakâya, the body of perfect bliss, is the eternal world-order, the sum total of all the verities of natural and moral laws which dominate all existence, whose revelation is the Dharma and whose incarnation in human form is called the Enlightened One, the Buddha, he who has found the truth and teaches it.

The Sambhogakâya is, as it were, the static aspect of God, while the two others are dynamic. The Nirmanakâya is kinetic and the Dharmakâya potential; and all three are one and the same,—just as energy remains the same in all its phases and transformations.

The Sambhogakâya corresponds to God the Father in Christian doctrine, and from him proceed both the Nirmanakâya, and the Dharmakâya; the three are one and the same, though each of them is conceived as a personality (*kâya*) of its own, and the three are present in their human incarnation in the Buddha. A Bodhisattva, a seeker after the *bodhi* or

enlightenment, becomes a Buddha by finding the *bodhi*. As soon as the *bodhi* is attained he comprehends the eternal truth of the world; he teaches the right religious doctrines, and he is the climax of the evolution of truth in life.

It is interesting to notice that in spite of the abstract and philosophical tone of Buddhism, the need of personifying the highest religious authority shows itself in this doctrine of the *Trikâya* which, notwithstanding many fundamental differences, is very similar to the orthodox conception of the Christian Trinity.

THE MEANING OF THE CHRISTIAN TRINITY.

According to Christian theology, God has three aspects. (1) He is not only supernatural and transcendent, he is not only the law of existence which remains the same whether or not it be actualized in nature, but he is also immanent. And God immanent in nature appears in two forms which constitute the second and third persons of the Trinity: (2) in the concrete conception of the God-man, the divine personality in whom egotism or self-will has made room for goodness or God's will; and (3) in the more generalized notion of the tendency to press onward on the path of progress, to realize the ideal of mankind in the aspiration of establishing the kingdom of God on earth.

As God the Father he is the Eternal, the Law that molds existence, the ultimate *raison d'être* which remains the same for ever and aye.

This abstract being which is without beginning and without end manifests itself in the actually realized world. It appears as the working world-order called by Greek Christians the *Logos* and finds its consummation in the appearance of the ideal man, the God-man or Christ, and in this aspect it is called "God the Son." It manifests itself in life as the superpersonal ideal, the incarnation of truth and righteousness, but since this ideal is predetermined in the constitution of being, its principle is co-eternal with God the Father. Thus the doctrine is upheld that Christ is begotten of God from eternity, being as it were the *Logos* of the actual world, and it is stated that the world is created through the Son.

The third person of the Godhead is less clearly defined and for a time it was doubtful how the Holy Ghost ought to be conceived. A Trinity of some kind was needed for both historical and logical reasons. All duality is inharmonious and tends to find its solution in a third element, viz., in a combination of the two-hood. In some pre-Christian religions the Trinity was made up of the members of the threehood of the family, i. e., God Father, God Mother and God Child, as for instance Osiris, Isis, Horus. But in other religions there were other

trinities which did not find a prototype in the human family but were of a more abstract, sometimes more physical, sometimes more logical, nature. Thus we have in Babylon Anu, Ea and Bel; in India Brahma, Vishnu and Shiva; in ancient Etruria Tinia, Thalma and Menrva.

Among certain heretical sects the Holy Ghost was conceived as the Mother of Christ, but this conception was not accepted by the church. We must remember that the Hebrew word '*ruah*' is of feminine gender, and among some of the Græco-Egyptian gnostics it was replaced by *Sophia*, a feminine conception of wisdom. Later on the same idea was expressed by *pneuma* which is neuter, and since the humanization of the conception of God in the shape of father, mother and child was scorned as pagan, the Holy Ghost was finally treated as a kind of neuter element in the orthodox conception of God.

The Holy Ghost is, as it were, God in the making. It is God as the divine dispensation; it is the advance movement in the development of mankind, the justice of history, the power which makes for righteousness. Thus we have the seeming contradiction in church dogmas that Christ was begotten through the Holy Ghost, not directly by God the Father; and that the Holy Ghost proceeds at the same time from both God the Father and God the Son.

The Holy Ghost being God in the making, i. e., the divine dispensation of history, forms a unity in itself which is the principle of evolution reaching its climax in the ideal of the God-man. At the same time it is the good will as established in the new dispensation, in the kingdom of God proclaimed by Christ.

That such is the underlying logic of the doctrine of the Trinity can scarcely be doubted, although most arguments and explanations have been formulated more instinctively than with clear philosophical insight and logic.

THE SUPERPERSONAL GOD

CONCLUSION.

THERE is one superpersonality where the prefix "super" has the intensified meaning "supreme." This is the superpersonality of God, not of the gods of pagan antiquity, but of God whom Plato calls *ὁ θεός*, the God.

In a certain sense the Christian God-conception is as much a superpersonal presence in the minds of the people as were the pagan deities it supplanted. But after all there is in Christianity an aspect of the conception of God which is higher and which comes to the surface if we dig down to the bottom rock on which rests this grandest thought which the religious consciousness of man has been able to produce. The purpose of the God-conception is to represent that universal and eternal presence which shapes existence in its totality and in every detail; it denotes that reality in which we live and move and have our being, the ultimate authority of right and wrong, the standard of truth and error and the eternal norm of all existence, and this omni-

presence is a superpersonality in the highest sense of the word.

God is not a person; he is not an individual. He is the norm of existence, the law of nature, the cosmic order, and as such he is an effective presence in the world of reality. God is the formative principle in creation, the determinant of evolution; he is the logic of events, the consistency of existence, the prototype of reason both in the causal connection of actualities and the rational faculty of man.

Is such a conception a mere illusion, or does it represent some actuality? And here we will say that the facts of experience compel us to grant that the religious instinct of man has assuredly not been misguided on this point. The formulation of the deity as an individual being, its personification, its humanization, and the childish notions connected with it, the idea that God is like ourselves, an egotistical, vainglorious and imperious person, are superstitions which naturally arise in immature minds. But the underlying truth of it, that there is a norm of existence, that the nature of right and wrong, truth and error and the general lawdom of cosmic existence can be definitely determined, cannot be denied, for our very existence as rational beings, the possibility of science, the actuality of human reason, the reliability of logical argument, the fact that we are ensouled with moral aspira-

tions, the gist of human life and its significance, bear testimony to it. All these phenomena, so important in our experience, prove that there is an eternal norm, and this norm which in our lives becomes the authority of conduct, is God.

In a certain sense God is supernatural, for the world-order of which we can reconstruct the purely formal features in pure mathematics and logic, is the condition not only of this actual world of ours but of any possible world. It applies not only to nature as we know it from experience, but to any possible nature whether it exists in spheres unknown, in purely mental constructions like geometry, or even merely in dreams. Its validity is without exception; it does not contradict nature but, in this sense, it is above nature—it is supernatural.

This supernatural God constitutes a system of norms, and whenever we try to formulate them in clear rules or theorems such as those propounded in mathematics, these eternal norms are seen to be a system, and constitute a unity so as to be comparable to an organism of which all parts are organs whose functions are fully understood only when considered in their cooperation. They are co- and sub- and superordinated parts, and their significance appears only when considered in their unity. In this sense God bears a close resemblance to a person and in this sense only may we speak of the personality

of God, for we must bear in mind that God is not an individual or a person as is man. The personality of man is temporal; the personality of God is eternal. Man's thoughts are consecutive, God's thoughts are the truths which neither originate nor pass away; they are the laws of nature, the determinant factors of all that happens. The thoughts of man are discursive phases of reasoning. They are centered around his ego, and they are subject to error. There is no ego in God, and his thoughts, being eternal, are infallible, and the potency of their application is unfailing.

Man has developed into a person, into a rational being capable of searching for the truth and following definite purposes, because the world is dominated by a consistency of being which mirrors itself as universal law, and in this sense man, the incarnation of reason, has been shaped by the world-order, and it may fitly be said that he has been created in the image of God. While man is like unto God we may in poetic language personify God as if he were like unto man, but in fact he partakes in no wise of man's limitations; he bears no features of transient individuality but is eternal and omnipresent while man is concrete, local, and transitory.

The difference between God's personality and man's, or rather between God's superpersonality and man's personality, is not in degree but in kind. As

Yahveh, the God of Israel, says in Isaiah lv. 8-9, "My thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways. . . . For as the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways, and my thoughts than your thoughts."

There is one more reason why the term superpersonal can with special propriety be applied to God, and it almost eclipses all others, and contains all of them. It is this, that God—the superpersonal God as here described—is the prototype of all personality. The character of the universe, the constitution of the cosmos, its inmost being and significance reveals itself better and more completely in a person than in any other object of creation, and so we may conclude with the statement to be interpreted in the light of the foregoing expositions, that every person in the measure that he attains the ideal of personality is a revelation of God.

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
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